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COMMENTARIES ON THE PUBLIC ACTS OF
INDIANA, 1927, III-THE COGNOVIT
NOTE ACT.
G. A. FARABAUGH AND WALTER R. ARNOLD*
Since 1853 it has been the judicially declared public policy of
the State of Indiana not to recognize the attempted conference
of powers of confession and warrants of attorney in promissory
notes and other writings obligatory. The Supreme Court attri-
buted the basis for this policy to legislation requiring that the
party making a confession of judgment, should, at the time, make
affidavit that the debt is just and owing, and that such confes-
sion is not made for the purpose of defrauding his creditors.'
It was not until the Irose case2 that explicit judicial pronounce-
ment was made that the public policy of the State was opposed
(except as inhibited by the full faith and credit clause of the
federal Constitution) to the enforcement of judgments taken
in other states without service of process or appearance by de-
fendants; the earlier decisions apparently going off on the con-
struction of the statutes affecting confessions of judgment in
the courts of Indiana and not to any prohibition by public policy
against such provisions in such instruments. 3 The Irose case,
however, settled the law as to the public policy of Indiana on
such provisions in clear and unmistakable language, and left
*See biographical note p. 119. This is the third of a series of Commen-
taries on the Public Acts of Indiana, 1927, contributed to the Indiana Law
Journal by Mr. Farabaugh and Mr. Arnold. For previous articles, see
III Indiana Law Journal, 351-444, and IV Indiana Law Journal 112.
1 Burns R. S. 1926, Sec. 640; Coonley v. Tracy, et al. 4 Ind. 137; See also
Ferrand v. Mc~lease, 1 Ind. 87; Craig v. Glass, 1 Ind. 89.
2 Irose v. Balla, 181 Ind. 491 (1912).
3 McPheeters et al v. Campbell, 5 Ind. 107.
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nothing to operate in favor of the power given by a cognovit
note solvable in this state, if action on the instrument itself, or
on any judgment perforce such provision, were here commenced,
and by three decisions following that case such policy became
strongly entrenched and firmly established in the jurisprudence
of Indiana.4
In 1927 our legislature concluded the public policy needed
some further fortification, and carried the taboo against cognovit
notes or contracts for payment of money a step further, and
made it penal for any person or corporation to
"directly or indirectly procure another, or others, to execute as maker, or
to indorse, or assign a cognovit note,"
and, further that
"whoever being the payee, indorsee, or assignee, thereof, shall accept and
retain in his possession any such instrument, or whoever shall conspire or
confederate with another, or others, for the purpose of procuring the exe-
cution, indorsement or assignment of any such instrument, or whoever shall
attempt to recover upon or enforce within this state any judgment obtained
in any other state or foreign country upon any such instrument, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not
less than fifty dollars and not exceeding five hundred dollars, to which may
be added imprisonment for not less than thirty days and not exceeding six
months at the Indiana State Farm."5
It is the purpose of this article to analyze this statute and
suggest conclusions of construdtion and administration of its
provisions.
A proper treatment, study, and discussion of this act naturally
suggests a subdivision thereof into five categories:
1-Constitutionality of the act in its entirety.
2-Operation of the act in relation to foreign judgments on
such paper rendered before the enactment, and on paper executed
antecedent to the law.
3-Operation of the act in relation to paper executed subse-
quent to its enactment- (a) within the state solvable within the
state; (b) within the state solvable without the state; (c) with-
out the state solvable within the state; and (d) without the state
solvable without the state.
4 Wieler v. Diver, Adrnr., 78 Ind. App. 26; Egley v. T. B. Bennett & Co.,
196 Ind. 50; Rodenbeck et at v. Crews State Bank (Ind. App.) 163 N. E.
616.
5 Acts Indiana 1927, p. 656.
COGNOVIT NOTE ACT
4-Operation of the act in relation to judgments taken on
paper made subsequent to its enactment.
5-Incidental considerations having regard to administrative
and procedural features.
1. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT IN ITS ENTIRETY.
Under this head we shall not consider the full faith and credit
clause of the Federal Constitution, as that question, and inci-
dental constitutional questions, naturally fall under a considera-
tion of the act in its effect upon judgments rendered without the
state and sought to be enforced in Indiana. Neither is it in-
tended hereunder to treat of the constitutionality of the act in
relation to contracts executed or judgments taken prior to the
going into effect of the act, as consideration of those questions
naturally fall under subsequent categories. We are here primar-
ily concerned with an analysis of the statute as a whole as bear-
ing upon its constitutionality-may it stand or shall it fall as
an entirety or as to any subject-matter falling under its obvious
scope?
The title to the act seems in compliance with all constitutional
requirements effective in Indiana. It contains but one subject
and that is "cognovit notes;" while "judgments" on cognovit
notes are not specifically mentioned in the title, they appear as
"matters connected therewith"--remedies directly related to the
execution and procurement of the notes, and having to do with
the fulfillment and enforcement of the obligations; and, conse-
quently, logically opened to view by the title. The prohibition
against the procurement of cognovit notes is identified in the
title and the matter of penalty for violating the statute is like-
wise indicated.
A defect, which construction will obviate, does appear on the
score of sufficiency of the title to "express" the subject of "other
written contract to pay money."8  If these words be construed
ejusdem generis to the subject-matter mentioned in the title, i.e.,
"notes," and have application to, say, bills of exchange, bonds,
promissory notes, sight and other drafts, trade acceptances, etc.,
etc., the words "other written contract to pay money" appear
there in harmony with the Constitution; but if it was intended
by such words to render the statute applicable to "all other writ-
'3 Constitution of Indiana, Art. 4, Sec. 19.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ten contracts containing a promise to pay money," whether
assimilable to a "note" or not, then, it is suggested, such "othe
written contracts" would be without the pale of the title. Surely,
the legislature has no right to disregard the Constitution by the
expedient of definition! If it could, then
"An Act defining draught animals, providing for their care, and prescrib-
ing penalties,"
would be a sufficient title (by defining "draught animals" to
include "horses, cows, dogs, sheep and chickens") to embrace a
provision that all cows shall be watered three times each day.
Or, by a title relating to and 'defining" cemeteries, the legisla-
ture might legislate on the subject of golf grounds, by the simple
expedient of providing that
"For the purposes expressed in this act, 'cemeteries' shall include all
places of sepulchre for the dead and all grounds given over to the general
public for the purpose of playing recreational games on holidays".
Such an evasion of the Constitution by the legislative authority
will not, of course, be assumed when there is present the means
of escape from such assumption by reasonable construction.
As noted heretofore, it has been held quite consistently, by our
courts of review, that the public policy of Indiana, established
prior to the enactment of the statute, forbids the enforcement-
according to their tenor-of cognovit notes executed within the
state to be performed within the state or executed without the
state to be performed within the state; consequently, as the sub-
ject-matter has relationship to fraud and oppression, it must be
conceded as being within the police-power province of the legis-
lature to enact a statute which forbids the procurement within
the state of cognovit notes, or their enforcement by the courts of
this state according to their tenor.
2. OPERATION OF JUDGMENTS RENDERED AND PAPER EXECUTED
PRIOR TO THE ACT.
Any interpretation of the act, other than granting to it purely
prospective operation, would clearly render the whole act null
and void under Section 24 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Indiana, and Article I Section 10 of the fed-
eral Constitution. As such a construction is always to be
avoided, and the act itself is susceptible to a construction render-
ing its operation prospective solely, it can be laid down as a
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postulate, not arguable, that the statute has only a prospective
operation, because a construction otherwise would render it null.
It is, therefore, to be assumed that as to all notes executed prior
to the effective date of the act and all judgments based on "such
instruments", the law as exposited in the Irose and Egley cases,
supra, will continue to govern.
By analogy, the provision in the act prohibiting the retention
of
"possession of any such instrument, the assignment thereof, the conspiring
or confederating with another, or others, for the purpose of procuring,
* * * the assignment of any such instrument, or the attempt to recover
upon or enforce within this state any judgment obtained in any other state
based on 'such instrument.'"
has reference only to "such instrument" executed subsequent to
the going into effect of the Act.
With the foregoing conclusions admitted, the field of analysis
is narrowed to the following four classes of instruments and
judgments:
Cognovit notes executed and judgments rendered on "such in-
struments" subsequent to the taking effect of the act in the fol-
lowing circumstances, respectively:
(a) Cognovit notes executed within the state solvable within
the state; and foreign judgments thereon.
(b) Cognovit notes executed without the state solvable with-
in the state; and foreign judgments thereon.
(c) Cognovit notes executed without the state solvable with-
out the state; and foreign judgments thereon.
(d) Cognovit notes executed within and solvable without
the state of Indiana, and foreign judgments rendered thereon.
3 AND 4. OPERATION OF THE ACT IN RELATION TO PAPER
EXECUTED AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS THEREON
SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENACTMENT.
(a) Executed within the State solvable within the State.
The whole force and vigor of the statute, it appears to us, is
applicable to "such instruments" which are specifically de-
nounced. The penal provisions of the statute are operative and
the whole instrument is clearly void, and no other state in the
Union will enforce or recognize as valid such contracts regard-
less of its own public policy, provided the public policy of Indi-
ana, as declared by the act, is specially pleaded in such state;
and in event a judgment should be procured in a foreign state
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on "such an instrument" without personal service of process
upon, or voluntary appearance of, the defendant, so as to give
the court jurisdiction over his person, on any such judgment be-
ing brought to this state, for enforcement, on proper plea, the
judgment would be held a nullity in our courts and subject
plaintiff, and any attorney seeking to enforce the judgment
here, who is advised of the basis of the judgment, to the penalties
fixed by the act.
(b) Cognovit Notes executed Outside of the State Solvable
within the state and foreign judgments thereon. Naturally, the
decisions of the Supreme and Appellate Courts, enouncing the
public policy of this state as it existed prior to the enactment of
the law under review, are in no manner diminished in effect with
reference to instruments falling in this category. The Irose
case, supra,-holding that the validity of a promissory note, pay-
able within this state, must be determined by the laws of this
state, and that courts here have the right to go behind a judg-
ment taken thereon under a warrant of attorney, to determine
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment by reason
of invalidity of the warrant-will, of course, continue a rule of
decision on such instruments. However, it was never held that
"such instruments" could not constitute the foundation for a
judgment either in a foreign state, or in this state, when the
cognovit and warrant of attorney portion of the note was dis-
regarded-ignored as if it did not exist, and issuance of and
service on, or personal appearance constituting waiver of process
by, defendant appears in the record. The question arises whether
such procedure, and such remedy continues despite the statute
with respect to cognovit notes issued abroad but solvable here,
where no effort is made to invoke the cognovit feature thereof.
Or, in other words, in contracts executed without, but solvable
within, the state, with the obnoxious clause written therein, is
the whole instrument invalidated in the same manner as is true
where the cognovit note is made within, solvable within the
state? In other words, does the statute assume to operate extra-
territorially, beyond the boundaries of the state with regard to
instruments executed without the state?
It is always to be borne in mind that this is a penal statute
and consequently the rule strictissimi juris applies against the
assumption of crime on a particular state of facts. The lan-
guage must be construed to exclude law violation, unless such
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construction is an unnatural and strained one. Whatever is not
made a crime by this statute will not result in invalidating
former civil rights under it, because the act does not attempt to
deal, and does not affect, except consequentially, civil rights and
remedies on cognovit notes as therein defined.
Ordinarily a statute which denounces the commission of some
act a crime, has relation to its commission and venue within the
state. Examining some fundamental principles of criminal law
(for that is what we are now dealing with) we note that a crime
is essentially local; an offense against the sovereignty offended;
and can be taken notice of and punished only by the sovereignty
offended. A state has no interest in an offense committed else-
where, nor has it the power to enforce its will beyond its limits. 7
Therefore, it can be no crime to have in one's possession a cogno-
vit note executed without the state but solvable within the state.
Its civil status would be exactly as defined by the Supreme Court,
supra. It would be enforceable as evidence of a debt, but not
according to the tenor of the warrant therein contained. So
much for having possession of the obligation, without dealing
with it.
How about dealing with this sort of paper within the state?
When the instrument comes within the state it is, of course,
subject to its laws. It is then, "such a note," and amendable to
the provisions of the statutes governing. Any transaction, other
than the enforcement of the instrument by action, is governed
by the lex loci situs. It will be particularly noted that there
is no prohibition in the statute against enforcing such instru-
ment in the courts of this state. The prohibition is against the
attempted enforcement of a "judgment obtained in any other
state or foreign country based upon any such instrument,"
meaning thereby the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction over
the maker by virtue of such portion of the instrument as con-
stitutes the warrant of attorney-without service of process or
appearance by the defendant, and, usually when the defendant
has no knowledge whatever of the pendency of the proceedings
against him.
There is no prohibition against retention of any instrument
payable within this state executed in another state. There is no
7 Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15, 61 L. Ed. 565; In re: Fowles, 47 L. R. A.
N. S. 227; In re: Grice, 79 Fed. 627; State v. Clark, 178 Mo. 20, 76 S. W.
1007.
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prohibition or penalty against any attempted enforcement of
such a note or, for that matter, against the attempted enforce-
ment of any cognovit note wheresoever executed and wheresoever
payable. What the act prohibits and renders criminal, if the
legislation is read in the light of the decisions cited under note
seven, supra, are only the following acts:
(1) Procuring, within the state of Indiana, another or others
to execute a cognovit note.
(2) Procuring, within the state of Indiana, another or others
to indorse or assign a cognovit note.
(3) Acceptance and retention in his possession by the payee,
indorsee or assignee of any cognovit note executed in the state of
Indiana.
(4) Two or more persons conspiring or confederating for
the purpose of procuring the execution of a cognovit note within
the state of Indiana.
(5) Two or more persons conspiring or confederating for the
purpose of procuring an indorsement or assignment of a cogno-
vit note executed in the State of Indiana.
(6) Attempting within the state of Indiana to recover upon
or enforce any judgment of another state taken on a cognovit
note executed in the state of Indiana.
Therefore, the possession or enforcement of a cognovit note,
executed without the state, but solvable within the state, is not
made a crime; nor is it a crime for one to attempt to enforce a
foreign judgment on such a cognovit note (jurisdiction being
exercised on the basis of the warrant), but under the Irose case,
supra, the attempt will prove futile if properly challenged. Nor
is it made a crime to bring action on and reduce to judgment
such a note within this state, on proper issuance and service of
process, but the cognovit feature of the note will be ignored, the
act in hand not having affected the juridical situation as it existed
prior to 1927. However, if after the execution of such a note
without the state, the payee brings it into Indiana and there
others procure him "to indorse or assign such cognovit note"
within the state, then, while the payee has committed no crime,
those who have "procured" or "conspired or confederated to
procure," the indorsement or assignment, are guilty, and the
indorsement is void, but the instrument is still valid in the hands
of the payee.
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It has been suggested to the authors of this article that if
this construction prevailed, (making it no offense to retain and
enforce in this state a cognovit note executed without but pay-
able within the state) then it would be entirely at variance with
the construction of other criminal laws which provide that, e.g.,
"The manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, and possession of intoxicating
liquor for beverage purposes is prohibited and shall be punished", etc.
under which, on the same anology, it might be argued, that as
the state has no power to prohibit or punish offenses occurring
in another state, if the liquor were manufactured in Canada,
then it would constitute no crime to possess it in Indiana. The
plain distinction is that in the one instance the taboo is against
all intoxicating liquor; in the other, not the making of the note,
but the procurement-it is always to be recalled that it is no
offense to make such a note, nor for anyone to possess it where
it has, in this state, undergone no contractual alteration.
Thus, if the statute under consideration were to read:
"The execution, indorsement, assignment, procurement, or possession of
any note which contains a provision," etc., etc., "is prohibited and shall be
punishable," etc.
a different question would arise. We do not hold that it would
be beyond the capacity of the legislature to so enact. But the
fact is it has not so enacted.
We have, under this category, yet to consider the endorse-
ment or assignment of "such an instrument". It must be ad-
mitted that notwithstanding the instrument is made without
the state, when it enters this state the legislature can control it by
appropriate legislation. Procuring another to endorse and
assign "such instrument" when it comes into the state, appears
to be an offense. Likewise, if it undergo such contractual alter-
ation, and in this state the indorsee or assignee "shall accept
and retain" the instrument, such indorsee or assignee is also
punishable. But if the assignment or endorsement be made in
this state (without procuration and the instrument again leave
the state for acceptance in another, such acceptance beyond the
borders of this state would not constitute a crime, nor would the
subsequent bringing of action thereon in this state make the in-
dorsee punishable, because the copulative "and" is used in the
statute, i.e., "shall accept and retain," (in this state), whereas
only the matter of retaining in the hypothetical case instanced,
has occurred in this state.
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However, were the endorsee to "accept" the endorsed instru-
ment in this state, he would acquire no title to the paper by the
endorsement, besides being liable to punishment; we do not,
however, believe it would operate to discharge the maker's
obligation to the original payee on the paper.
(c) Cognovit Notes executed without the State Solvable
without the State, and Foreign Judgments Thereon.-As
has been heretofore noticed, the state being without power
to affect, by penal laws, transactions confined wholly within an-
other state, no extra-territorial virtue can be ascribed to the act;
therefore, so far as the execution-whether by procurement, con-
federacy, conspiracy, etc.,--of a cognovit note payable without
the state is concerned, in a state where such notes are not placed
under a like ban of the statute as here, whether executed by a
citizen of Indiana, or not, the statute is inoperative. If, how-
ever, such a cognovit note, after execution, comes into this state,
and is here subjected to contractual alteration by way of assign-
ment or endorsement, the rules obtainable in case of paper
executed without, but payable within, the state would seem to
apply to such endorsement or assignment and to the assignee
or endorsee.
If such a note be unaffected by any assignment or endorse-
ment, title remaining with the payee, or there be an assignment
or endorsement without the state, and the note be reduced to
judgment by either payee, assignee or endorsee, in a foreign
jurisdiction, where the power of cognovit and warrant is recog-
nized, and under such power and without service of process or
personal appearance, it is difficult to see how the courts of Indi-
ana could fail to give due force and virtue to such a judgment,
or how they could refuse to recognize a judgment, whether the
executant of the note was or was not a resident of Indiana at
the time of executing the instrument.8
A more difficult question would arise were there a taint of
contractual.history effected in Indiana, by endorsement or assign-
ment in this state, and the endorsee or assignee should bring
8 Roche v. McDonald, 48 S Ct. 142, 275 U. S. 449, 72 L. Ed. 365, 53 A.
L. R. 1141; Christmas v. Russell, 18 L. Ed. 475; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210
U. S. 231, 52 L. Ed. 1039, 28 Sup. Ct. 641; Keeney v. 4upreme Lodge L.
0. M. 252 U. S. 411, 64 L. Ed. 638, 10 A. L. R. 716, 40 Sup. Ct. 371;
In re: Kensington, 46 L. Ed. 190, 22 Sup. Ct. 102, 183 U. S. 263; Egley v.
T. B. Bennett & Co., supra.-Note 4, p. 94.
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the action on the instrument in a foreign jurisdiction, recover
judgment on jurisdiction obtained by virtue of the warrant of
attorney, and seek the enforcement of such judgment in this
state. We believe, that while such assignee or endorsee would
violate no law of this state, in such attempt, he would not be suc-
cessful if the defense of his lack of right to avail himself of the
cognovit provision of the note were pleaded and proved. Not on
the theory that the provision was unenforceable, but on the
theory that the judgment plaintiff had no right or authority to
enforce it, not having acquired legal title to the paper by the
void endorsement or assignment.
(d) Cognovit notes Executed within the State and Solvable
without the State; and foreign Judgments rendered Thereon.-
In the hands of the payee or any indorsee becoming such in
Indiana (whether before or after maturity) it would appear
that the paper is a nullity and no action can be brought thereon
in this state; and, of course, any judgment procured by such
payee or endorsee in another state, on the strength of the cog-
novit and warrant of attorney, would be subject to the same in-
firmities if enforcement were sought in Indiana, as would be the
case mentioned under sub-division (c) supra. However, were
the payee to endorse the same without the state prior to matur-
ity, and vest title to a holder for value in due course within the
meaning of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act,9 it is be-
lieved the latter would have the same rights with respect to
cognovit notes executed within but solvable without the state as
would one who, in the same circumstances, took title to a cogno-
vit note executed without and performable without the state-
both as to his rights to maintain an action on the instrument in
Indiana, and to enforcement of judgments taken without the
state perforce jurisdiction acquired by the cognovit and war-
rant only.
5. INCIDENTAL CONSIDERATIONS HAVING REGARD TO
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS AND PROCEDURAL FEATURES.
We have, in this article, confined our study to consequential,
rather than to main or direct implications of the act. To reiter-
ate: the statute defines and fixes the punishment for a crime, but
our present interest is directed to the incidents of the act on civil
rights. We shall not go into the question of the administration
9 Burns R. S. 1926, See. 11364- sub-div. 2; Burns R. S. 1926, See. 1141
et seq.
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of the criminal law under its provisions, except to touch on the
probable status and criminal liability of the attorney who is
retained to enforce cognovit notes or judgments taken thereon.
Collating the sub-divisions as previously outlined, we suggest the
following status in the following instances:
When the attorney takes for collection a
(a) Cognovit note executed within and solvable within the
state, with knowledge of such facts, he is equally guilty with his
client under the penal provisions of the act.
(b) Cognovit note executed without the State, solvable with-
in the state, without further contractual incidents occurring
within the state he is guilty of no crime; but if with knowledge
of the facts, he receives the same from an endorsee who became
such in Indiana, he is equally guilty with his client.
(c) Cognovit note executed without and solvable without the
state, there is no liability unless he, with knowledge of the fact,
receive the same from and act for an endorsee who became such
in the State, in which event he is liable with his client.
(d) Cognovit note executed within the state and solvable
without the state, with knowledge of the fact, he is liable if he
received the same from the maker or endorsee who became such
in the state (whether before or after maturity), but otherwise
if he receive the same from an endorsee who became such with-
out the state.
(a-i) Foreign judgment on a cognovit note rendered per-
force the cognovit and warrant executed within the state and
solvable within the state, with knowledge of the facts, if he seek
its enforcement within the state, whether for payee or any en-
dorsee, he is guilty.
(b-i) Foreign judgment on a cognovit note, rendered per-
force the cognovit and warrant, executed without the state, but
solvable within the state, is not liable unless, with knowledge of
the fact, he seek to enforce it on behalf of one who became an
endorsee within the state.
(c-1) Foreign judgment on a cognovit note, rendered per-
force the cognovit and warrant, executed without the state and
solvable without the state, is not liable unless with knowledge
of the fact, he seek to enforce it on behalf of a judgment plaintiff
who obtained it by assignment or endorsement in Indiana.
(d-i) Foreign judgment on a cognovit note, rendered per-
force the cognovit and warrant, executed within the state and
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solvable without the state, will be guilty if he seek its enforce-
ment with knowledge of the facts, unless he represent one who
became a holder in due course without the state.
Some fine questions are likely to arise in the determination of
the status of security, by way of chattel mortgage or other collat-
eral instrument, given to insure the payment of cognovit notes
executed, or with a subsequent contractual history which fetches
them, under the ban of the law. Obviously, the debt itself is not
discharged by the vitiation of the note evidencing it, but were
one to sue on such an instrument and ask that the security be
exhausted in the same action, where would it lead? We have,
unfortunately, not space to pursue this interesting subject fur-
ther, but it merits study and comment.
In view of the fact that so many substantive features of the
subject of cognovit notes in Indiana are left undisturbed by the
act, it would not be out of place, we believe, by way of addenda,
to repeat the enumeration of the law applicable to promissory
notes executed in one state and payable in another, having con-
flicting laws, as laid down by Judge Gause in the Egley case,
supra;'0
"1. All matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation and
validity of the note, including the capacity of the parties to contr-act, are
to be determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. 2. All
matters connected with the payment, including presentation, notice, demand,
protest and damages for non-payment, are to be regulated by the law of
the place where, by its terms, the note is to be paid. 3. All matters re-
specting the remedy to be pursued, including the bringing of suits, service
of process, and admissibility of evidence, depend upon the law of the place
where the action is brought."
We have sought, by the inditement of this article, to steer our
course by the cardinal points of this compass, with the full faith
and credit clause of the federal Constitution, the cited provisions
of our own Constitution, and elementary principles of criminal
jurisprudence in view constantly from which to note our bear-
ings. Despite these safeguards, our reasoning may in instances
be fallible, but if there be error, it is the inherent weakness of
man that is at fault, and not lack of conscientious purpose to
come to a disinterested conclusion on the numerous interesting
questions suggested. We cannot transcend our own natural
limitations.
10 Egley v. T. B. Bennett & Co., 196 Ind. 50 (55).
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On the merits or demerits of the statute, we trust this com-
ment may be vouchsafed us: Does it not, after all, merely amount
to the creation of another crime of what anciently was, and in
numerous states is now, regarded as a legitimate transaction of
commerce? We have nothing to urge against the public policy
of the state-as it existed without the encumbrance of this act-
to deny recognition of a power given by an Indiana contract to
a creditor or his assigns to go unceremoniously into court, in
any state giving the power effect, and there obtain a judgment
without an opportunity to the defendant to have his day in court.
The policy is laudable, but what fortification does it inherit by
making many men unwitting criminals? Must every public policy
be reinforced by a penal law? Then why not pass a criminal law
punishing one by six months imprisonment who undertakes to
assign his expectancy in his father's estate before his ancestor's
demise-generally and innocently believed by the layman as
feasible, but against public policy? Or why not deal thus with
one who shall at an unguarded moment disclose a confidential
communication of a character he or she would not be required to
disclose in court? Or incarcerate one "in durance vile" who
shall (innocently believing it proper) in his will provide that
his estate shall be held in trust for the benefit of his heirs to the
fifth generation? or send the man for a term to the penitentiary
because he acted on the belief that he could waive his exemption
rights by contract? or hang a husband and wife because they be-
lieved it eminently proper, in the circumstances of perpetual
strife between them, to agree that they should be divorced and
that the one would not contest the pending action instituted by
the other, brought to legally consummate what was factually in
being?
Are we not, like moths to the spurt of a gas-jet, fluttering
hectically, in .a self-immolating frenzy of reform by legislative
fiat? Ten criminal statutes now shout for attention where one
whispered when our fathers were young. Legislatures, more
impatient than meditative, pile Ossae of jail-cells upon Pelions
of "don'ts." Whither will it all lead? The answer will be given,
perhaps not in this, but in the next or some succeeding genera-
tion. Futility, it seems to us, has already cast her depressing
shadow over those ardent souls who spend their lives cultivating
their own inhibitions and pronouncing anathemas on those who
fail to conform to the common denominator of reform determin-
ism.
